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Abstract: Even though Key (2016) has done a very thorough job of assembling evidence
showing that fish are unlikely to have the neurological capacity to be conscious and feel pain,
there will still be a significant number of behavioural biologists who want to continue
maintaining that fish do have consciousness and suffer from pain. In this commentary the
reasons for people resisting the conclusions of the evidence are discussed. The reasons
revolve around three aspects of the debate: the overblown respect humans have for the
powers of consciousness in our day-to-day behaviour, the often used assumption that the
possession of complex behaviour must mean that an animal is conscious, and by the
misapplication of words such as ‘pain.’
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Introduction. What is fascinating about the debate addressed by Key’s (2016) target article is
that the topic divides scientists into two distinct groups. Key represents those who consider
that the important task is to examine the neurological evidence for the existence in fish of
consciousness and the ability to feel pain. He has done an excellent job of assembling the
evidence to show that it is very unlikely that fish do feel pain, but as the commentaries on
his article will no doubt show, there will still be people who remain unconvinced and
continue to maintain that fish are conscious and feel pain. I want to understand why this
second group remains unconvinced, and my commentary explores potential reasons.
Barriers to rational discussion. I propose that three aspects of human behaviour get in the
way of rational discussions of pain in fish. These are the consequences for the discussion
about fish pain of the assumption many make that consciousness is more influential than it
really is in deciding how humans behave. It is also assumed that complex behaviour has to
imply consciousness. Finally, the language used to describe pain and consciousness in
humans is misused when applied to non-humans and hampers rational discussion. In what
follows I explore the consequences of these three factors.
1. The awe with which we regard our own conscious powers. A little introspection shows
that much of our behaviour is accomplished with little participation of conscious processes
(Gray 2004, Custers and Aarts 2010, Kahneman 2011). For many motor tasks, such as
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returning a tennis ball, the conscious experience of the event lags behind the action by
about one fifth of a second (Gray 2004). Consciousness reviews rather than directs.
Evolution has favoured the myth that our lives are directed by conscious decisions.
Humphrey (2006) proposes that through this myth we create a sense of self to which events
can happen, further giving us the ability to create goals and give life meaning.
For most humans, the myth of conscious control of their lives is so powerful and persuasive
that action without it, even in non-humans, seems impossible. If, instead, one takes the view
that many of the complex behaviours that we employ are monitored and informed by
consciousness but are not directed by it, then we are freer to assess non-human behaviour
for what it is.
2. The belief that complex behaviour has to imply consciousness. An important corollary of
the belief that consciousness is of over-riding importance to complex human behaviour is
that it must be true of animals too. Otherwise one has to acknowledge that unconscious
processes can direct complex behaviour.
As a result of their belief that complexity means consciousness, scientists studying animal
behaviour are adopting language that assumes that animals have conscious feelings and
emotions because they show complex behaviours. For example, Verheijen and Flight (1997)
conclude unequivocally that fish have subjective experiences and can suffer. Yue et al (2004)
report that rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) feel fear when attacked by a simulated
predator. In a similar vein, Bateson and Matheson (2007) attribute feelings of pessimism to
starlings (Sturnus vulgaris) and, more generally, Wiepkema and Koolhaas (1992) consider
that all vertebrates employ emotions to deal with their environment.
The use of the language of feelings and emotions, including pain, is dangerous because of
the human meanings that they carry. We need to adopt a more cautious terminology
(LeDoux 2015). The modern resurgence of research that considers mental states as
legitimate targets of investigation is a reversal of the views of early ethologists. For example,
Tinbergen (1951) wrote that “… to ascribe a causal function to something that is not
objectively observable [e.g., consciousness or feelings] often leads to false conclusions.”
Whilst there are ways to explore the mental states of non-humans, as demonstrated by
Cheyney and Seyfarth (1990, 2007), many present-day researchers are abandoning the
evidence-based approach to the understanding of animal minds and making unjustified
assumptions derived from their view that complex behaviour means conscious action.
3. The misuse of language. There are also semantic and philosophical issues when the words
‘conscious’ and ‘pain’ are used to speak about non-humans. As humans, we have good
reason to believe that others share our own mental experiences (Figure 1). We even have
neural processes that mirror the actions of others, thus giving us a good insight into what
they are thinking (e.g., Frith and Frith 2006). We also work on the assumption that fellow
humans have brains and behaviours that are closely similar to our own; so we are
comfortable assuming that others think and feel as we do. As Baron-Cohen (1995, p. 21) has
written, “Attributing mental states to complex systems (such as a human being) is by far the
easiest way of understanding it.” So words such as ‘pain,’ ‘fear,’ ‘suffering,’ and
‘consciousness’ are words we use to describe and express our own and others’ mental
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states. When it comes to non-humans — and this is particularly true of fish — we cannot use
the words ‘conscious’ or ‘pain’ in the same way.
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Figure 1. A conceptual modal of the way meaning can or cannot be given to the word
‘consciousness’ in the human and non-human contexts.

Without a clear view of how a word can be used and what we refer to when we use it, we
cannot deal with the world. The way meaning is to be understood has been discussed by
many philosophers. In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein (1953) considered that the meaning
of words is defined by their use in a process he called a ‘language game’ whose rules we
learn in early life. In particular (paragraph 244), he describes how a child might learn to use
the word ‘pain’ — “A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and
teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.” In
this view of the meaning of words we can only agree on how to use a word if we share a
common view of the world (see Figure 1). As we do not share a common view of the world
with a fish, can we then use words from human experience to describe the inner experiences
of a fish?
Conclusions. This commentary illustrates how the human preoccupation with the conscious
part of our behaviour distorts our view of how non-humans behave. Abandoning this
preoccupation makes it easier to accept that fish can achieve complex behaviours through
automatic processes. Consequentially automatic responses to noxious stimuli do not need
the animal to experience pain. In the literature on animal welfare, scientists discussing
consciousness, pain and suffering in non-humans use these concepts as if they were well
understood. As I have tried to show, in the human context the use of these words is mutually
understood, but I have argued that we are not justified in using the same words when
talking about non-humans (Dawkins 2012). There is a strong case for a much more rigorous
approach to how concepts such as ‘pain’ and ‘fear’ are used when referring to non-humans.

3

Animal Sentience 20016.015: Hart Commentary on Key on Fish Pain

References
Baron-Cohen, S. (1995) Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Bateson, M. and Matheson, S. M. (2007) Performance on a categorisation task suggests that
removal of environmental enrichment induces 'pessimism' in captive European starlings
(Sturnus vulgaris). Animal Welfare, 16, 33-36.
Cheney, D. L. and Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) How monkeys see the world. Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
Cheyney, D. L. and Seyfarth, R. M. (2007) Baboon metaphysics. The evolution of a social
mind. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Custers, R. and Aarts, H. (2010) The unconscious will: how the pursuit of goals operates
outside of conscious awareness. Science, 329, 47-50.
Dawkins, M. S. (2012) Why animals matter: animal consciousness, animal welfare, and
human well-being. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frith C. D. and Frith, U. (2006) The neural basis of mentalizing. Neuron, 50, 531-534.
Gray, J. (2004) Consciousness. Creeping up on the hard problem. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Humphrey, N. (2006) Seeing red: a study in consciousness. Cambridge: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press.
Kahneman, D. (2011) Thinking, fast and slow. London: Penguin Books.
Key, B. (2016) Why fish do not feel pain. Animal Sentience 2016.003.
LeDoux, J. (2015) Anxious. The modern mind in the age of anxiety. London: Oneworld
Publications.
Tinbergen, N. (1951) The study of instinct. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Verheijen, F. J. and Flight, W. F. G. (1997) Decapitation and brining: experimental tests show
that after these commercial methods for slaughtering eel Angullla anguilla (L.) death is
not instantaneous. Aquaculture Research, 28, 361- 366.
Wiepkema, P. R. and Koolhaas, J. M. (1992) The emotional brain. Animal Welfare, 1, 13–18.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953) Philosophical investigations. Oxford: Blackwell Publisher
Yue, S. Moccia, R. D. and Duncan, I. J. H. (2004) Investigating fear in domestic rainbow trout,
Oncorhynchus mykiss, using an avoidance learning task. Applied Animal Behaviour
Science, 87, 343–354.

4

